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Abstract
We investigate if and when the leading theories of debt maturity are useful in understanding the
maturity choices of nonfinancial firms in a major developing economy, Turkey. Unlike most research,
we use a dataset that provides financial information on not only large, publicly-traded firms but also
small, privately-held firms across a wide variety of industries. Our strongest finding is that firms
that have high leverage also have long debt maturity. Size, asset maturity, and credit quality are
also important, although results depend on the type of firm group considered. The stability of the
economic environment as measured by inflation and interest rate volatility also influences debt maturity
decisions. Our findings are broadly consistent with the liquidity risk theory. The agency theory is
also partially useful in understanding firms’ maturity decisions, particularly for medium- and large-
sized, publicly-traded firms. The signaling theory is most useful when the sample consists of large,
publicly-traded firms. We find little evidence that taxes matter for maturity decisions. Our findings
also provide some evidence that borrower-lender relationships matter for debt maturity structures.
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1 Introduction
The theories of debt maturity structure have been developed mainly with publicly-traded firms in
developed economies in mind. However, the typical firm in most economies is a privately-held firm.
Privately-held firms differ from publicly-traded firms in many respects, including size, expected life,
taxability, ownership, flexibility, industry, economies of scale, financial market access, and level of
information asymmetry (see, for example, Ang, 1991, 1992; Scherr and Hulburt, 2001). In addition,
given the immense cultural, institutional, and financial differences across borders, the nature and
extent of these differences are likely to vary considerably between developed and developing economies
(see, for example, LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2001; De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen, 2008). Therefore, the question of whether
and to what extent debt maturity theories apply to the typical privately-held firm in developing
economies is an important research question. The fact that the structure of debt maturity has serious
implications for macroeconomic and financial stability in developing economies (see, for example,
Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2006; BCBS, 2011) makes this question all the more interesting.
Despite the importance of this question, there is a dearth of papers that study privately-held firms
in developing economies. To our knowledge, the only exceptions are Stephan, Talavera, and Tsapin
(2011) who examine Ukraine and Bas (2012) who examines 24 developing economies. The present
paper contributes to this literature by studying the case of a major developing economy, Turkey. We
use a comprehensive dataset compiled by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) that
provides financial information on a wide variety of firms in Turkey. The fact that our dataset is
quite comprehensive enables us to provide a more accurate analysis of the typical firm’s debt maturity
structure than most previous studies, including those on developed economies. Our dataset also allows
us to systematically investigate the debt maturity structure differences between publicly-traded and
privately-held firms, large and small firms, and manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms.
Our empirical analyses build on the major theories of debt maturity (agency theory, tax-based
theory, signaling and liquidity risk theories, and maturity-matching theory). Our strongest and most
robust finding is that firms that have high leverage also have long debt maturity. Leverage is also the
most economically significant determinant. These findings indicate that the typical firm is concerned
about the risk of bankruptcy and/or premature liquidation by lenders as suggested by debt maturity
theories. In addition, we find relatively strong evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between
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debt maturity and indicators of firm credit quality. Hence, firms that rely heavily on shorter-term
debt appear to be a mix of the high- and low-quality firms, with the middle-quality firms using more
longer-term debt.
Firm size and asset maturity also play important roles in the determination of firms’ debt maturity
structures. However, results seem to depend on the type of firm group considered. While important for
medium-to-large, publicly-traded firms, size does not impact on the maturity structures of privately-
held, micro and small enterprises. Moreover, size matters more for firms considering issuing long-term
debt for the first time than for firms that want to reoptimize the amount of existing long-term debt in
their capital structure. Therefore, creditor-shareholder conflicts appear to be a more relevant concern
for larger, publicly-traded firms and for firms issuing long-term debt for the first time. The latter
finding, in turn, suggests that adverse selection problems are a more serious agency problem than
moral hazard problems in the provision of long-term debt financing for our sample firms.
The evidence for maturity-matching is strongest in the case of medium-to-large privately-held firms
in the non-manufacturing sector. We also find that when firms do not match maturities, they do so in
different ways. While privately-held micro and small enterprises tend to issue debts of shorter maturity
than their assets, large, publicly-traded companies tend to issue debts of longer maturity than their
assets. Since maturity-mismatches of the former sort are more risky and since privately-held micro
and small enterprises tend to have low credit quality, maturity-mismatches present a substantially
more serious risk for this group of firms.
We also find some evidence that the level of asymmetric information might play a role in determin-
ing the debt maturity structures of large, publicly-traded firms. Macroeconomic variables also appear
to exert some impact on firms’ debt maturity decisions. Specifically, we find that increases in inflation
and interest rate volatility generally reduce debt maturity, particularly for privately-held small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Given that SMEs are an important part of any economy, these
findings underscore the importance of maintaining a stable and predictable economic environment
that facilitates long-term contracting among businesses. Finally, we find little consistent evidence for
the importance of firms’ taxability or growth opportunities.
Overall, our results are probably best understood within the context of the liquidity risk theory. It
is important to emphasize, however, that neither individually nor jointly, can the leading theories of
debt maturity entirely account for the observed maturity structures. Indeed, we find some tentative
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evidence that relationships between borrowers and lenders might also be playing an important role
in shaping firm’ maturity structures. For example, our findings suggest that only sufficiently credit-
worthy firms can form long-term credit relationships with lenders. Moreover, for firms with existing
credit relationships, the relevance of the leading debt maturity theories appear to decline considerably.
Instead, findings appear to be more consistent with the view that lenders insure their clients against
idiosyncratic as well as aggregate financial risks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theories of debt maturity,
develops empirical hypotheses, and provides a summary of the relevant empirical literature. Section
3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 describes the empirical methodology and presents the
main results. Section 5 conducts a battery of robustness checks. Section 6 examines the debt maturity
structure differences across firms of various types. Section 7 provides an overall assessment of our
result. Section 8 provides concluding remarks.
2 Hypotheses and empirical evidence
In this section, we develop the various debt maturity structure hypotheses to be investigated and
review the existing empirical evidence.
2.1 Hypotheses
The theoretical literature provides a number of non-mutually exclusive hypotheses about the determi-
nants of firm debt maturity structure. These are: agency hypotheses, tax hypotheses, signaling and
liquidity risk hypotheses, and maturity matching hypothesis. We now consider each in turn.
2.1.1 Agency hypotheses
Growth opportunities: Myers (1977) argues that a firm’s future investment opportunities are akin
to growth options. Accordingly, the value of a firm depends on whether the firm’s managers optimally
exercise these options. If the firm is financed entirely by equity, managers (acting on behalf of share-
holders) optimally exercise all profitable growth options. With debt in the firm’s capital structure,
however, managers may fail to exercise some of the profitable options if creditors stand to capture a
large enough fraction of the expected earnings. Myers (1977) shows that this underinvestment problem
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can be solved by issuing debt that matures before the growth options are to be exercised.1 Therefore,
a firm’s debt maturity should decrease with its growth options.
Firm size: Smith and Warner (1979) argue that creditor-shareholder conflicts faced by smaller
firms are likely to be greater in variety as well as in severity than large firms (see, also, Pettit and
Singer, 1985; Ang, 1992). As noted above, shortening debt maturity can help mitigate these agency
problems. Therefore, a firm’s debt maturity should increase with its size.
2.1.2 Tax hypotheses
Tax rates: Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1985) develop a multi-period model in which the choice
of debt maturity involves a trade-off between the per-period tax-advantage of debt and the costs of
debt issuance and possible bankruptcy. Their model implies that the firm lengthens debt maturity as
the tax advantage of debt decreases to ensure that the remaining tax advantage of debt is not less
than expected floatation and bankruptcy costs. Thus, a firm’s debt maturity should decrease with its
effective tax rate.
Term structure of interest rates: Brick and Ravid (1985) also present a multi-period tax-based
framework to analyze debt maturity choice. In their model, a firm optimally chooses long debt
maturity when there is a tax advantage of debt and the term structure of interest rates is increasing.
This is because an increasing term structure accelerates the tax advantage into the early periods of
the debt obligation, thereby increasing the total tax advantage in present value terms. Hence, a firm’s
debt maturity should increase with slope of the term structure of interest rates.
Volatility of interest rates: Kim, Mauer, and Stohs (1995) develop a multi-period model to analyze
how corporate debt maturity affects investor tax-timing options to tax-trade corporate securities. They
show that a more volatile interest rate process produces more volatile bond prices, which in turn leads
to a larger tax-timing option value. Since the value of the tax-timing option, like standard options,
increases with maturity, it becomes optimal for the firm to issue long-term debt when interest rate
volatility is high. Thus, a firm’s debt maturity should increase with the volatility of interest rates.
Volatility of firm value: Another implication of the Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1985) model
concerns the impact of firm value volatility on debt maturity. The authors show that debt maturity
increases when the volatility of firm value decreases, as the firm does not have to rebalance its capital
1Other creditor-shareholder conflicts including asset-substitution, claim-dilution, and overinvestment can also be
mitigated by using shorter-term debt (see, for example, Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet, 1980; Leland and Toft, 1996;
Childs, Mauer, and Ott, 2005). Note that overinvestment problems can also arise when there is a conflict of interest
between shareholders and managers. Hart and Moore (1995) show that when a firm with new investment opportunities
has little or no long-term debt, the management will have a tendency to finance unprofitable investments by borrowing
against future earnings. This view would imply that a firm’s debt maturity would increase with its growth options.
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structure as often to moderate expected bankruptcy costs. Hence, a firm’s debt maturity should
decrease with the volatility of firm value.
A common feature of the above tax-based models is that they analyze the debt maturity decision
taking the firm’s capital structure (leverage) decision as given. However, Wiggins (1990) and Lewis
(1990) argue that theoretical predictions can be altered substantially when capital structure and
debt maturity structure decisions are modeled simultaneously. For instance, Wiggins (1990)’s model
predicts a positive relation between volatility of firm value and debt maturity, which is in direct
contrast to Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1985). Lewis (1990) seems to go even further, arguing that
taxes may in fact be completely irrelevant for debt maturity decisions. It is not clear, however, that
it is the difference in the treatment of capital structure and maturity structure decisions that is the
driver of the discrepancies between the implications of the two types of models.2
2.1.3 Signaling and liquidity risk hypotheses
Signaling : Flannery (1986) explores the signaling implications of a firm’s debt maturity choice when
a firm’s insiders are better informed than outside investors about the firm’s quality. If debt issuance
is costless, high-quality firms cannot signal their type by their choice of maturity since low-quality
firms can mimic this choice. In the resulting pooling equilibrium, high-quality firms are under-valued
and low-quality firms are over-valued by the market. When issuing debt is sufficiently costly, however,
low-quality firms may be forced to issuing long-term debt to minimize issuance costs. This allows
high-quality firms to distinguish themselves from low-quality firms by issuing short-term debt. In the
resulting separating equilibrium, firms of different quality are accurately valued by the market.3 Thus,
the signaling hypothesis predicts an inverse relation between a firm’s debt maturity and its quality.
Liquidity risk : Diamond (1991) also explores the choice of debt maturity when a firm has private
information about its future credit-standing. A firm expecting favorable news about its credit-standing
(i.e. a high-quality firm) can reduce the cost of capital by issuing short-term debt and refinancing
at better terms following the arrival of good news. However, even high-quality firms may sometimes
receive unfavorable news, which may make it difficult for the firm to repay its debt. In that case, the
lender can sell the firm’s assets or remove the borrower from control (termed liquidation). Lenders,
2Wiggins (1990) and Ravid (1996) note that different assumptions concerning the tax shelters in default state are
behind the opposite implications of the Wiggins (1990) and Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1985) models. In addition, as
noted by Stohs and Mauer (1996), Wiggins (1990) does not endogenously derive the optimal maturity structure, making
it impossible to know whether his result holds at the optimum. On the other hand, Brick and Ravid (1991) argue that
the conflicting predictions of the Brick and Ravid (1985) and Lewis (1990) models stem from the different assumptions
concerning the priority of different types of claims in default state.
3Kale and Noe (1990) show that issuance costs are not a necessary condition for the existence of a separating equi-
librium in which high-quality firms signal their type by issuing short-term debt.
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however, have a tendency to liquidate too often from the borrower’s point of view because they do
not internalize the part of future benefits that may accrue only to the borrower (the control rent). A
greater proportion of short-term debt in the firm’s capital structure makes liquidation more likely.
This theoretical framework has a number of interesting implications regarding the choice of debt
maturity in the cross-section of firms. Firms with high quality can issue short-term debt because the
risk of liquidation is minimal. Firms with medium quality issue long-term debt to reduce the risk of
liquidation. Finally, firms with low quality have no choice but to issue short-term debt because their
liquidation value is too low to entice creditors to lend long-term. As a result, there are two types
of short-term borrowers: Firms with high quality and firms with low quality, with medium-quality
firms borrowing longer-term. Thus, the liquidity risk model predicts that a firm’s debt maturity first
increases and then decreases with the firm’s quality.
2.1.4 Maturity-matching hypothesis
An age-old maxim in the finance profession is that a firm should match the maturity of its assets and
liabilities. As explained by Morris (1976), when debt is too short-term, the asset may not generate
sufficient cash flows by the maturity date to service the debt. Although this possibility exists for
longer maturities as well, it is less likely and has the advantage of pushing the possible liquidity crisis
further into the future. Debt of maturity longer than the asset life can also be risky because of the
uncertainty regarding the source and volume of the cash flows necessary to service the debt after the
asset is retired. Matching maturities can help a firm manage its expected costs of financial distress by
reducing these risks.4 Thus, a firm’s debt maturity should increase with the maturity of its assets.
2.2 Empirical evidence
A large number of empirical studies have been carried out in the past twenty years to test whether the
predictions of various debt maturity theories hold up in the data. This literature can be broken down
into two broad categories: Studies that use a sample of publicly-traded firms and those that use a
sample of privately-held firms. While studies generally find evidence in support of maturity-matching,
the findings concerning the rest of the debt maturity hypotheses are mixed at best.
4The agency and liquidity risk perspectives also suggest that matching maturities can be beneficial for firms. In
particular, Myers (1977) argues that maturity-matching can mitigate creditor-shareholder conflicts by scheduling debt
repayments to correspond to the decline in future value of assets currently in place. Diamond (1991) argues that liquidity
risk can be reduced by financing long-term assets with long-term debt.
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2.2.1 Publicly-traded firm studies
Most empirical work falls into this category. Using data on a sample of U.S. firms, Barclay and Smith
(1995), Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003), and Johnson (2003) find that debt maturity varies inversely
with growth opportunities and directly with firm size as predicted by the agency perspective. Guedes
and Opler (1996), however, find that maturity is negatively associated with both growth opportunities
and firm size, again using data on U.S. firms. Stohs and Mauer (1996), on the other hand, report a
positive association between maturity and both growth opportunities and firm size. The evidence for
the agency perspective is therefore rather mixed. The signaling and tax hypotheses receive even less
support in these studies as the estimated coefficients on relevant proxy independent variables often
have the wrong sign and/or are economically insignificant. Goyal and Wang (2013) and Newberry and
Novack (1999) are notable exceptions that provide evidence that strongly supports, respectively, the
signaling hypothesis and some of the tax-related hypotheses.5 Finally, Diamond (1991)’s liquidity risk
model finds strong support in many of these studies, as they uncover a non-monotonic relationship
between debt maturity and the proxies for firm (credit) quality.
Empirical studies on developed economies other than the U.S. also reveal mixed results. Using data
on U.K. firms, Ozkan (2000, 2002) provide evidence that firms with more growth opportunities in their
investment sets use shorter-term debt, as predicted by the agency perspective. However, the estimated
coefficients on the firm size variable attain opposite signs across the two studies. The tax-related and
signaling hypotheses receive little or no support in both studies. Cunat (1999) reports findings similar
to those in Ozkan (2000, 2002) for Spanish firms. Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006) focus on U.K.,
France, and Germany. They find evidence in support of the agency perspective in the U.K. and but
not in Germany or France. The Brick and Ravid (1985) term structure hypothesis receives reasonable
support in all three economies. No strong support is found, however, for the remaining tax hypotheses
as well as for the signaling and liquidity risk hypotheses in any of the three economies. The signaling
view finds strong support, however, in the case of Australian firms (Alcock, Finn, and Tan, 2012).
The results of developing economy studies are probably even more diverse. In their study of 30
developing and developed economies, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) find that debt maturity
varies directly with size and inversely with growth opportunities as predicted by the agency perspective.
5Goyal and Wang (2013) test the signaling prediction by tracing the evolution of debt issuers’ default risk. They find
that issuing short-term debt reduces borrowers’ asset volatility and increases their distance-to-default. Newberry and
Novack (1999), on the other hand, find evidence of an interest rate term structure effect on debt maturity as predicted
by Brick and Ravid (1985). On the other hand, their finding on the impact of effective tax rates on debt maturity is
the opposite of what is suggested by Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1985). The finding is nevertheless consistent with a
“tax clientele” argument where long-term debt is used more intensively by firms with high marginal tax rates that can
use interest tax shields more cost-effectively (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992).
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By contrast, the agency perspective receives little or no support in Cai, Fairchild, and Guney (2008)
and Deesomsak, Paudyal, and Pescetto (2009), who focus instead on China and the Asia-Pacific region
(Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore), respectively. In fact, Cai, Fairchild, and Guney (2008)
find that debt maturity is positively related with growth opportunities as predicted by Hart and Moore
(1995), suggesting that overinvestment problems are more important in China than underinvestment
problems. Another view that finds little support in both studies is the signaling view. The authors
attribute the lack of support for the agency and signaling views to the existence of close relationships
between firms and their banks, which renders information and agency considerations much less relevant.
The tax and liquidity risk hypotheses, on the other hand, receive somewhat greater support in these
studies. Kirch, Renato, and Terra (2012) focus on five South American economies (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Peru, and Venezuela) and report results that lend partial support for each of the four major
groups of debt maturity hypotheses. Most closely related to ours is perhaps the study by Arslan and
Karan (2006) who, like us, focus on Turkey. Differently from us, however, these authors focus on
publicly-traded industrial firms and explore the corporate governance implications of debt maturity
structure. Their findings are generally consistent with the agency and signaling hypotheses but not
with the tax hypotheses, whereas the relevance of the liquidity risk hypothesis is not investigated.
2.2.2 Privately-held firm studies
Privately-held firms differ from publicly-traded firms in many respects. Due to the lack of pertinent
data, however, empirical debt maturity studies of such firms are much fewer in number. In an early
study, Scherr and Hulburt (2001) find that some determinants of debt maturity for privately-held
firms are similar to those for publicly-traded firms while others are not in the U.S.. Their findings
lend considerable support for default risk, maturity of assets, and capital structure as determinants
of privately-held firms’ debt maturity. The authors also find that firms with either high or low de-
fault risk use debt of shorter maturities than do firms with intermediate default risk as predicted by
Diamond (1991). However, almost no evidence is found for the importance of firms’ growth options,
taxability, or level of asymmetric information in determining debt maturity. Taking a slightly dif-
ferent approach, Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) analyze the maturity of loans to U.S. privately-held
businesses. Although the authors do not attempt to test all major debt maturity hypotheses, their
evidence is generally consistent with the agency perspective.
In the context of developed European economies, Heyman, Deloof, and Ooghe (2008) bring evi-
dence from Belgian firms that supports the signaling perspective but not the agency or liquidity risk
perspectives. Like Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008), these authors do not investigate the tax hypothe-
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ses of debt maturity. The relevance of the tax hypotheses is explored, however, by Lopez-Gracia and
Mestre-Barbera (2011) and Gonzalez-Mendez (2013) in the context of Spanish firms. While the former
study provides relatively strong evidence that taxes matter for maturity decisions, the latter study
reports only weak evidence in favor the tax hypotheses. The latter study also finds evidence that is
consistent with the predictions of the agency and maturity-matching hypotheses. Finally, Magri (2010)
aims at sorting out supply and demand explanations of the maturity choice in the context of Italian
firms. She argues that lenders (i.e. the supply-side of the market) are likely to have a greater say in
maturity decisions than borrowers and to exert control over borrowers by choosing shorter maturities
when informational asymmetries and default risk are more important.
We are aware of only two privately-held firm studies on developing economies. Using data on 24
developing economies, Bas (2012) finds that in economies with higher tax rates firms have shorter debt
maturity as predicted by Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1985). She also shows that larger firms have
longer maturity but finds no evidence that growth opportunities are related with maturity. Stephan,
Talavera, and Tsapin (2011) focus instead on Ukraine and report evidence that is relatively more
consistent with the agency and signaling perspectives.
3 Data and variables
We next describe our data, construct proxy variables for the different debt maturity hypotheses, and
present key descriptive statistics.
3.1 Data
Our firm-level data come from the survey-based Sectoral Balance Sheets (SBS) dataset of the CBRT.6
Launched in 1989, this dataset contains by far the most comprehensive and representative annual
balance sheet and income statement data on Turkish non-agricultural non-financial firms. At the
end of the period under analysis, the firms in the SBS dataset account for about 60 percent of the
non-financial sector value added.
Even though our dataset goes back to 1989, we start our sample at 2004 for two reasons. First,
we want to understand the recent situation about firms’ maturity structure of debt in Turkey rather
than perform a historical analysis. Second, starting the sample at 2004 allows us to focus on the
period after the 2000-2001 economic crisis following which ambitious economic reforms were adopted
6The SBS data can be accessed at the CBRT’s webpage. Note, however, that due to confidentiality considerations,
the data are made available to the general public only at the sectoral level.
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and an attendant structural transformation took place in Turkey.7 This choice also helps to rule out
the period of heightened macroeconomic volatility as well as the period of strong disinflation of the
beginning of the 2000s. Our sample ends at 2013 as this is the last year for which data is available.
There are on average nearly 9400 firms in our dataset each year. These firms are legally either
corporations (59.6 percent) or limited companies (40.4 percent). According to Turkish law, only
corporations are allowed to issue publicly-tradable equity. As such, our sample corporations are either
privately-held (96.9 percent) or publicly-traded (3.1 percent).8 With possibly few exceptions, all
publicly-traded Turkish non-financial firms are included in the dataset. Our sample privately-held
firms, on the other hand, consist of (private) limited companies (41.1 percent) and privately-held
corporations (58.9 percent).
In our analyses, we restrict attention to firms with NACE Rev. 2 codes from C to J (except
D and E) to focus on the manufacturing and selected non-manufacturing sectors.9 We include all
thirteen NACE Rev. 2 manufacturing sub-sectors in our sample, which comprises nearly 46.9 percent
of all firms on average. The non-manufacturing sector, on the other hand, consists of five selected
sub-sectors and comprises roughly 53.1 percent of all firms.10
The dataset is quite diverse in terms of firm size. It includes most large firms in Turkey as well
as a large number of SMEs and microenterprises. Of the 9400 firms each year in the dataset, roughly
18 percent are microenterprises, 70.5 percent are SMEs, and 11.5 percent are large firms.11 Despite
the inclusion of small, privately-held firms in the data set, such firms are inevitably under-sampled, as
they constitute a relatively small part of the relevant population of firms in Turkey. This is especially
true for the smallest firms.12 The dataset nevertheless provides us with a unique opportunity to study
the financial decisions of small, privately-held firms in a developing economy context.
7See, for example, Turhan (2008) and Aysan, Gu¨ler, and Orman (2013).
8Publicly-traded corporations, while 3.1 percent of corporations, are only 1.8 percent of all firms in the dataset.
9NACE (Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community) has been created based on
ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) of the United Nations. NACE Rev. 2 corresponds to ISIC Rev.
4 and is organized in a way that is suitable to the structures of the European economies.
10The non-manufacturing industries we include are: i) construction (F), ii) wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor
vehicles and motorcycles (G), iii) transport and storage (H), iv) accommodation and food service activities (I), and v)
information and communication (J). On the other hand, we exclude some of the non-manufacturing industries such as
those related to education, public administration, real estate, health, energy (D), water and waste management (E) etc.
These industries are generally under the influence of various sorts of government intervention that distort the operation
of market forces. Note also that since most of our sample non-manufacturing firms are service firms, we will use the
terms “service” and “non-manufacturing” interchangeably in the sequel.
11This classification is based on European Union’s firm size classification that uses annual balance sheet totals (assets).
Microenterprises, SMEs, and large-sized firms are, respectively, firms with balance sheet totals less than EUR 2 million,
between EUR 2 million and EUR 43 million, and more than EUR 43 million.
12Given available data, it is not possible to compute exact statistics. However, we estimate that the ratios of value
added by sample microenterprises, SMEs, and large firms to their population counterparts are roughly about 10 percent,
60 percent, and 90 percent, respectively.
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We perform some basic filtering on our firm-level data. Specifically, we drop firms with negative
assets, negative sales, negative equity, and negative debt. In addition, we include only those firms that
have at least three years of consecutive data as the calculation of some of our variables (for example,
earnings volatility) requires observations from multiple years. Moreover, to reduce the impact of
outliers on our results, we winsorize both tails of the data at 1 percent. The final sample is an
unbalanced panel of 11687 firms with 56231 firm-year observations.
Our macroeconomic data, on the other hand, are collected from a variety of sources including the
CBRT, Borsa Istanbul, Turkish Statistical Institute, Undersecretariat of Treasury of the Republic of
Turkey, and World Development Indicators.
3.2 Proxy variables
In this sub-section, we define the proxy variables to be used in our analyses. We begin with the
dependent variable, debt maturity, and then consider, in turn, each of the independent variables
which serve as proxies for various debt maturity hypotheses. Finally, we introduce a number of
control variables. Given that the overwhelming majority of our sample firms are privately-held, all
proxy variables we develop are based on book values. In Section 5, we investigate the robustness of
our results to alternative variable definitions.
3.2.1 Proxy for debt maturity
Our dependent variable, denoted DebtMat, is a measure of the maturity structure of debt calculated at
the firm level. Following convention, we define DebtMat as the share of long-term debt to total debt,
where long-term debt is any debt maturing in more than one year. The measure of long-term debt
consists of financial debt (76 percent) and loans from shareholders and affiliated firms (parent, sister,
and subsidiary) (24 percent) but excludes trade debt, whose determinants are likely quite different
from that of straight debt. 91.2 percent of our firms’ financial debt, in turn, is made up of bank debt.
3.2.2 Proxies for agency hypotheses
Growth opportunities: Our proxy for a firm’s available growth opportunities, denoted Growth, is
defined as the percent change in a firm’s assets. This definition assumes that a firm’s recent growth
is a good measure of its future growth potential. Versions of this definition have been used in many
studies including Scherr and Hulburt (2001) and Heyman, Deloof, and Ooghe (2008). We expect a
negative association between Growth and DebtMat.
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Firm size: Firm size, denoted Size, is defined as the natural logarithm of (inflation-adjusted) assets
as in, among others, Guney and Ozkan (2005) and Heyman, Deloof, and Ooghe (2008). We expect a
positive association between Size and DebtMat.
3.2.3 Proxies for tax hypotheses
Tax rates: Following convention, the firm’s effective tax rate, denoted Tax, is defined as the ratio
of a firm’s tax payments to pre-tax income. We expect a negative relation between Tax and DebtMat.
Term structure of interest rates: Developed economy debt maturity studies typically use yields
on 10-year and 6-month government bonds as proxies for long-term and short-term interest rates,
respectively (see, for example, Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996). However, government
bond markets are not as advanced in less developed economies. For instance, the Turkish government
started to issue 10-year bonds only in 2010 and 5-year bonds did not exist prior to late 2004. Even
the 2-year government bonds were not consistently issued before late 2002. Historically, there has also
been a tendency of longer-term government bond markets to dry up during times of economic distress,
as exemplified by the disappearance of the 1-year and 2-year government bond markets during the
second half of 2001. In light of these facts, we define the slope of the yield curve, denoted Term,
as the 12-month average for the fiscal year of the yield differential between the 2-year and 3-month
government bonds. We expect a positive relation between Term and DebtMat.13
Volatility of interest rates: To measure interest rate volatility, IntVolat, we compute the standard
deviation of the monthly short-term (3 months) government bond yields over the current year as in
Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006). We expect a positive relation between IntVolat and DebtMat.
Volatility of firm value: In the absence of market values, we measure the volatility of firm value,
EarnVolat, by the standard deviation of operating income over total assets over the current and past
two years. Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006) use a similar definition.
We expect a negative relation between EarnVolat and DebtMat.
3.2.4 Proxies for signaling and liquidity risk hypotheses
Signaling : It is notoriously difficult to determine what would constitute a good proxy for a firm’s
quality. Different studies have used different measures as proxies including a firm’s abnormal future
earnings (e.g. Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996), Altman’s Z-score (e.g. Jun and Jen,
2003; Arslan and Karan, 2006), and (inverse of) the volatility of the firm’s earnings (e.g. Antoniou,
13We are grateful to Zeynel Harun Aliog˘ulları for his help in constructing the term structure series that goes back to
the early 2000s.
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Guney, and Paudyal, 2006; Cai, Fairchild, and Guney, 2008). To test Flannery (1986)’s signaling
hypothesis, we use an updated version of Altman (1968)’s Z-score as in Jun and Jen (2003) and
Arslan and Karan (2006), which is defined as
Z − score = 10.6EBIT + 0.169Sales+ 101RE + 10.4WC
Assets
+
0.3Equity
Debt
,
where EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, RE is retained earnings, and WC is working capital
(current assets minus current debt). Higher levels of Z-score indicate lower default risk and hence
higher firm quality. We expect a negative relation between Z-score and DebtMat.
Liquidity risk : Testing Diamond (1991)’s hypothesis of a non-monotonic relation between firm
(credit) quality and debt maturity is slightly more involved. Again, different studies have used different
approaches to do this. Barclay and Smith (1995) use bond and commercial paper ratings, Stohs and
Mauer (1996) use bond ratings and their square, Scherr and Hulburt (2001) use Altman (1968)’s
Z-score and its square, and Johnson (2003) uses firm size and its square. In this paper, we use an
approach similar to Jun and Jen (2003) in that we divide our sample firms into three groups based on
their financial condition as summarized by the Z-score statistic: the weakest 25 percent, the strongest
25 percent, and those in between. Diamond (1991)’s increasing, then decreasing relation predicts that
DebtMat should be positively related to Z-score for firms with weak financial condition (low quality)
and negatively related to Z-score for firms with strong financial condition (high quality). Including
the medium quality firms in our analyses helps us explore the point at which the relationship between
debt maturity and firm quality switches from being positively related to negatively related.
3.2.5 Proxy for maturity-matching hypothesis
Following Stohs and Mauer (1996), we define a firm’s asset maturity, denoted AssetMat, as the weighted
average of the maturities of current assets and fixed assets (net property, plant, and equipment). The
maturity of current assets is computed as the ratio of current asset to cost of goods sold. Stohs and
Mauer (1996) argue that current assets (e.g. inventory) support production, which can be measured
by the cost of goods sold. As such, this ratio can be viewed as reflecting the speed of consuming
current assets (Cai, Fairchild, and Guney, 2008). The maturity of fixed assets, on the other hand, is
calculated as the ratio of fixed assets to annual depreciation expense. The idea behind this measure
is that slower depreciation means longer maturity (Hart and Moore, 1994). Maturity-matching would
suggest a positive relation between AssetMat and DebtMat.
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3.2.6 Control variables
We employ a number of additional variables to control for effects not captured by our proxy variables.
These are: i) firms’ leverage ratios, ii) macroeconomic variables, and iii) crisis year dummies.
Leverage: As discussed earlier, researchers debated whether capital structure and debt maturity
decisions are sequential or simultaneous. Like the early theoretical studies, empirical studies initially
analyzed debt maturity decisions in isolation from capital structure decisions. For instance, Barclay
and Smith (1995) did not control for leverage in their maturity regressions. Stohs and Mauer (1996)
did control for leverage but without considering its nature as an endogenous variable. Most subsequent
work including Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) and Johnson (2003) have modeled capital structure
and debt maturity decisions simultaneously. These studies generally have found that firms that choose
high leverage also choose long maturity.14 Theoretically, firms that have high leverage might choose
long maturity in order to avoid liquidity risk (Diamond, 1991) or to delay exposure to bankruptcy
risk in (Leland and Toft, 1996). Therefore, we model capital structure and debt maturity decisions as
joint decisions. However, to highlight the implications of this modeling choice, we also present results
from the case where leverage is excluded from estimations and show how the two sets of results differ.
We define leverage, Leverage, as the ratio of a firm’s total debt to its total assets. We expect Leverage
to be positively associated with DebtMat.
Macroeconomic variables: Economy-wide variables also potentially influence firms’ debt maturity
decisions. In particular, the growth rate of the overall economy can be viewed as an indicator of the
investment opportunities available to firms (Myers, 1977; Smith and Watts, 1992). The inflation rate,
on the other hand, provides evidence on whether the local currency provides a stable measure of value
to be used in long-term contracting (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Fan, Titman, and
Twite, 2012). Accordingly, we include the annual rates of real GDP growth, denoted GDPGrowth, and
inflation, denoted Inflation, in our regression equations. We expect Inflation and DebtMat to be nega-
tively associated. GDPGrowth may be either negatively or positively related with DebtMat depending
on whether the underinvestment hypothesis or the overinvestment hypothesis is more relevant.
Crisis year dummies: The Turkish economy contracted sharply during 2008 and 2009 due to the
global financial crisis. In order to control for crisis effects, we include year dummies for 2008 and 2009
denoted by D2008 and D2009.
14See Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000) for a finding to the contrary. These authors argue that leverage and maturity
should be negatively related as agency costs can be mitigated by reducing leverage as well as by shortening maturity.
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3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all of our variables during 2004-2013. Consider first our
measures of debt maturity and leverage. The table shows that while the average firm financed 25
percent of its assets with debt in 2004, this figure increased to 39 percent in 2013, with an average
of 32 percent during our sample period. Firms (on average) not only used more debt in their capital
structure over time but also increased the share of long-term debt in their total debt, going from about
21 percent in 2004 to 37 percent in 2013. Thus, firms’ usage of long-term debt increased slightly more
rapidly than their use of total debt during 2004-2013. However, the fact that the median long-term
debt is considerably below the mean suggests that many firms use little or no long-term debt. In fact,
roughly 40 percent of our firms have exactly zero long maturity debt during our sample period on
average, falling from about 56 percent in 2004 to 28 percent in 2013.
Consider next the remaining firm-level variables. As the firm growth numbers indicate, the average
firm grew by about 19 percent from 2004 to 2013. Moreover, the fact that the median growth is
considerably below the mean growth indicates that there was a relatively small number of firms that
grew fairly rapidly during the sample period. The maturity of the average firm’s assets increased from
nearly 1.5 years to 6.3 years, with an average of 3.5 years. Except for a temporary increase during
2007 and 2008, the average firm’s volatility of earnings was on a downward trajectory. The tax burden
faced by the average firm fell slightly from 16 percent to 15 percent between 2004 and 2013, with an
average of 15 percent. As the firm quality numbers indicate, the average firm in 2013 was in worse
financial condition than in 2004. Moreover, the fact that the median is substantially lower than the
mean suggests that the majority of firms have relatively weak financial condition.
Turning to macro-level variables, Table 1 indicates that our sample period was a period with a
relatively high average GDP growth rate of about 4.6 percent a year. There was substantial variation
in growth rates, however, mainly due to the global financial crisis. Inflation fell from 10.6 percent in
2004 to 7.5 percent in 2013, with an average of 8.5 percent during 2004-2013. Interest rate differentials
fell from 3.5 percent to below 2 percent by 2005 and remained between 0 and 2 percent afterwards,
except for a small cross-over to the negative territory in 2012. Interest rates were fairly volatile thanks
in part to the global financial crisis.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
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4 Methodology and results
We now describe our empirical methodology and present the results from applying our methodology
to our full sample.
4.1 Methodology
We model debt maturity as a function of various proxies discussed in the previous section. Specifically,
we estimate the following fixed effects panel data model:
DebtMatit = β0 + αiLeverageit +
∑
j
βjXj,it +
∑
k
θkYkt + µi + it (1)
where DebtMatit is our measure of the maturity structure of debt calculated as the share of long-term
debt to total debt for firm i in year t, Leverageit, which is endogenous, is the leverage of the firm
defined as the ratio of a firm’s total debt to its total assets, Xj is the vector of debt maturity proxies
as discussed in the previous section, Ykt are the macro variables used to control for the state of the
economy; µi are the time-invariant unobservable firm-specific effects; and it is the error term. We
estimate Equation (1) with and without Leverage using Newey and West (1987)’s variance estimator
which produces consistent estimates when there is heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in standard
errors. When Leverage is included, we control for the simultaneity between DebtMat and Leverage
by instrumenting the latter using its first lag and the first lag of firm profitability (ratio of operating
income to total assets). The instruments pass Hansen (1982)’s test of instrument validity in all of our
regression analyses.15
4.2 Full sample results
Table 3 reports our results from estimating Equation (1). The first and second columns, respectively,
display the results from estimating Equation (1) without and with the fitted value of Leverage. The
third and fourth columns, in turn, display the results that are obtained by standardizing all variables
in the second column and those obtained by ranking statistically significant standardized coefficients
based on their absolute magnitude. The magnitudes are comparable across standardized coefficients
as each shows the impact of a one standard deviation change in the associated independent variable
on the dependent variable. In what follows, we elaborate on our findings with reference to various
maturity hypotheses.
15See Hansen (1982). In two of the firm quality regressions discussed in Section 4.2.3, we use real total asset growth
and the volatility of earnings as additional instruments to obtain a valid instrument set.
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[Insert Table 3 about here]
4.2.1 Agency hypotheses
Growth opportunities: Regardless of whether the regression includes Leverage or not, the coefficient
estimates on Growth are not significant. Thus, we find no support for both the underinvestment and
overinvestment agency hypotheses. Similar findings are reported in, among others, Stohs and Mauer
(1996) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) for the U.S., Magri (2010) for Italy, and Kirch, Renato, and
Terra (2012) for five Latin American economies.
Firm Size: The coefficient estimates on Size are positive and highly significant in both regression
specifications, suggesting that larger firms have longer debt maturity as predicted by the agency
perspective. However, the economic significance of this variable is debatable. This is because the
coefficient estimate in the regression with Leverage implies that a one standard deviation increase in
Size increases debt maturity only by about 0.12 standard deviations. These results are consistent with
the findings reported in the majority of empirical studies.
Therefore, our results provide mixed support for the agency perspective.
4.2.2 Tax hypotheses
Tax rates: While the coefficient estimate on Tax is negative and significant in the equation without
Leverage, it does not achieve significance in the equation with Leverage. This result is consistent
with Lewis (1990) who argues that if leverage and debt maturity are chosen simultaneously, then
taxes have no effect on the maturity structure of debt.16 This result is also in line with the empirical
findings reported in Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) for the U.S.
and Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006) for Britain and France.
Interest rates and volatility : Although the coefficient estimate on EarnVolat is not significant in
the equation without Leverage, it is marginally significant and positive in the equation that includes
Leverage. However, neither of these results is consistent with the tax perspective. Nevertheless,
a positive estimate might indicate that firms extend the maturity of their debt to avoid possible
liquidation as also found by Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006) for France, Cai, Fairchild, and
Guney (2008) for high-growth firms in China, and Kirch, Renato, and Terra (2012) for five Latin
American economies. Second, the estimate on IntVolat is negative and significant at the 5 percent
16Alternatively, this result could be due to the fact that effective tax rates (hence the tax advantage) are simply too low
(15 percent for the average firm) to have any significant influence on firms’ maturity choices, especially after accounting
for the key maturity determinants such as leverage.
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level in the equation that includes Leverage. Although this is inconsistent with the tax perspective as
well, it might indicate that firms avoid entering into long-term debt contracts when macroeconomic
uncertainty is high. A similar finding is reported by Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006) for British
firms. Finally, even though the coefficient estimate on Term is marginally significant in the equation
without Leverage, it has the wrong sign from a tax perspective. In the equation that includes Leverage,
Term’s coefficient estimate is not significant, in line with the empirical findings reported in Barclay
and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996).
Overall, we find no evidence in support of the tax perspective.
4.2.3 Signaling and liquidity risk hypotheses
Signaling : Although the coefficient estimate on Z-score is negative and significant in the regression
equation without Leverage, it turns insignificant when Leverage is included in the equation. An
insignificant coefficient estimate on the firm quality variable is also reported by Dennis, Nandy, and
Sharpe (2000) for the U.S. and Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006) for Britain, France, and Germany.
Note, however, that the coefficient on EarnVolat is marginally significant. To the extent that EarnVolat
proxies for firm quality, this finding is consistent with Flannery (1986)’s signaling hypothesis where
low quality firms (firms with high earnings volatility) borrow longer-term. Alternatively, the positive
relation between DebtMat and EarnVolat might be indicative of a “close relationship” between firms
and their lenders. Specifically, in a close borrower-lender relationship, lenders might want to ease their
clients’ financial stress by extending the maturity of credit (see, for example, Petersen and Rajan (1994)
for a general statement of this possibility). Given that our sample firms borrow on average about 25
percent of their debt from shareholders and related firms each year, this is a genuine possibility.17
Liquidity risk : To investigate the relevance of the liquidity risk perspective, we digress briefly
and consider the results reported in Table 3. This table displays the coefficients on Z-score from
estimating Equation (1) with and without Leverage separately for different Z-score quartiles. We find
that, in the equations without Leverage, the sign of the coefficient estimate on Z-score is positive and
significant for low- and medium-quality firms and negative and significant for high-quality firms. Even
though this pattern of estimated coefficients is consistent with Diamond (1991)’s hypothesis of a non-
monotonic relation between firm (credit) quality and debt maturity, the support for this hypothesis
is somewhat weakened by our finding of an insignificant estimate on Z-score for high-quality firms in
the equation that includes Leverage. Support for Diamond (1991) can also be found in Barclay and
Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Johnson (2003) for U.S. firms. Figure 1 shows visually the
17We provide additional evidence on this type of relationship-lending in Section 5.8.
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non-monotonic relationship between maturity and firm quality for our sample firms. In addition to
firms’ debt maturity structures, the figure also includes their leverage ratios in view of the importance
of this variable in the determination of maturity structures.
Overall, our results provide moderate support for the liquidity risk perspective while providing
only weak support for the signaling perspective.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
4.2.4 Maturity-matching hypothesis
Returning to Table 2, the estimated coefficients indicate that DebtMat and AssetMat are positively
and significantly associated, suggesting that firms with higher proportion of longer-term assets in their
balance sheet also choose longer debt maturity structures. This is true regardless of whether Leverage
is included in the regression equation or not. However, the economic significance of this result is
questionable as the coefficient estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in AssetMat
increases DebtMat only by about 0.02 standard deviations. Therefore, consistent with most empirical
studies, our results provide moderate support for the maturity-matching hypothesis.
4.2.5 Control variables
Leverage: The coefficient estimate in the regression equation with Leverage suggests a strong
positive association between DebtMat and Leverage. A one standard deviation increase in Leverage
increases DebtMat by about 0.41 standard deviations. Thus, the economic significance of Leverage
is orders of magnitude greater than that of other independent variables. Qualitatively, these results
are consistent with Diamond (1991) and Leland and Toft (1996) who argue that firms that choose
high leverage also choose long maturity to avoid premature liquidation or to delay their exposure to
bankruptcy risk. A positive and significant coefficient estimate is also reported by empirical studies
such as Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Johnson (2003) for the U.S., Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal
(2006) for Britain, France, and Germany, and Cai, Fairchild, and Guney (2008) for China.
More generally, our results underscore the importance of accounting for the simultaneity between
debt maturity structure and capital structure in understanding firms’ financial management decisions.
For one, failing to include Leverage in the regression equation could lead one to incorrectly conclude
that Z-score and Tax have significantly negative effects on DebtMat for the entire sample of firms.
Excluding Leverage also causes the economic significance of remaining variables to appear higher or
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lower than what they actually are. For example, while a one standard deviation increase in Size
increases DebtMat by about 0.12 standard deviations in the equation with Leverage, it increases
DebtMat by about 0.28 standard deviations in the equation without Leverage, thus substantially
overstating the impact of firm size on maturity.
Economy-wide variables: Our results do not provide evidence that GDPGrowth or crisis year
dummies have a significant impact on DebtMat, especially when Leverage is included in the regression.
We find, however, that Inflation is negatively associated with DebtMat in both regressions, indicating
that higher levels of inflation are associated with lower levels of debt maturity. Viewed as an indicator
of whether the local currency provides a stable measure of value to be used in long-term contracting,
Inflation thus has an impact on DebtMat similar to that of IntVolat discussed earlier. A significant,
negative coefficient estimate on Inflation is also reported by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999).
5 Robustness analyses and additional considerations
We perform a number empirical checks to ensure that our main results are robust.18 We also consider
a number of interesting variations in our baseline model.
5.1 Variable definitions
Dependent variable: Recall that our measure of debt includes financial debt (roughly 91 percent
of which, in turn, is bank debt) as well as loans from shareholders and affiliated firms. It might also
be interesting to see how our results would change if we used narrower definitions such as financial
debt or bank debt as alternative measures of debt. The second and third columns of Table 4 report
the results from estimating Equation (1) when DebtMat is defined either as the share of long-term
financial debt in total financial debt or as the share of long-term bank debt in total bank debt.19 The
first column is reproduced from Table 2 to ease comparison.
Although the results are by and large the same as before, there are a few small differences, es-
pecially between the first and third debt maturity specifications. First, the coefficient on Growth
turns significant (albeit at the 10 percent level) in the bank debt maturity equation. One explanation
might be that agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors are more severe when funds are bor-
rowed entirely from external sources rather than (at least partly) from shareholders and related firms.
18To save on space, we do not report all of these results. But, they are available upon request from the authors.
19Note that we also must make a corresponding adjustment in the definition of the leverage variable. Accordingly,
Leverage is defined as the ratio of a firm’s total financial debt to its total assets in the second column and as the ratio
of a firm’s total bank debt to its total assets in the third column. Financial debt differs from bank debt by the inclusion
of financial leasing payables, deferred financial leasing payable costs (-), and other financial debt.
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Second, the coefficient estimate on EarnVolat turns insignificant. As discussed earlier, a significantly
positive relation between maturity and earnings volatility might be due to a close relationship between
borrowers and lenders whereby lenders reduce their clients’ financial stress by extending the maturity
of their lending. In this case, an insignificant coefficient estimate on EarnVolat in the bank debt
maturity equation would suggest the absence of a close relationship between firms and their banks.
Third, the coefficient estimate on Tax turns marginally significant in the new regression specifications,
implying that firms with low effective tax rates increase the maturity of their debt when debt is either
financial debt or bank debt. From the lens of the Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1985) model, this
result likely reflects the fact that expected floatation and bankruptcy costs are higher in arm’s length
financial transactions, which in turn necessitates lengthening the maturity of debt to ensure that the
remaining tax advantage is not less than these higher costs.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Independent variables: For convenience, we begin with the economy-wide variables. We only
consider robustness to the choice of the term structure proxy as its definition is potentially less standard
than the others. We find that defining term structure as the difference between 2-year and 6-month
rather than between 2-year and 3-month government bond yields does not affect our results.20
Regarding the firm-level variables, however, our findings are more mixed. On the one hand,
replacing our version of Z-score with Altman (1968)’s original Z-score or replacing operating earnings
with EBIT or EBITDA in the calculation of earnings volatility does not affect our results. On the
other, when we use an unweighted measure of asset maturity (such as the ratio of fixed assets to annual
depreciation expenses) rather than the weighted measure we use, the coefficient estimate on the asset
maturity proxy ceases to be significant.21 However, as noted by Guedes and Opler (1996), a drawback
of unweighted measures is that they implicitly assume that other balance sheet items have a zero
maturity. Finally, when the investment opportunity set faced by a firm is instead proxied by capital
expenditures to total assets, the estimate on firm growth becomes positive and significant.22 A positive
association between a firm’s debt maturity and its investment opportunity set is consistent with Hart
and Moore (1995)’s overinvestment hypothesis, according to which sufficient amounts of long-term
debt prevent self-interested managers from making unprofitable but empire-building investments.
20We also considered a term structure measure based on the difference between the available longest and shortest
maturity government bonds. The results were similar.
21We should note, however, that the coefficient is still positive and highly significant if we restrict the sample to the
group of firms that consists of corporations. See Section 6.3 for more on this.
22We also tried using the ratio of research and development expenses to total assets as an alternative proxy, but its
coefficient estimate was not statistically significant.
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5.2 Choice of the sample start year
We also consider the sensitivity of our main results to the choice of the sample start year. Table
5 presents the results from estimating Equation (1) for samples that start in 2003, 2004, and 2005,
where the 2004 results are our baseline results reported in Section 4. Results show that the majority
of our qualitative findings are unaffected by this choice. However, there appears to be a break in the
data in 2003 after which the estimated coefficients on Growth and Z-score turn insignificant while
those on IntVolat and Inflation turn significant. These results might be interpreted as indicating that,
during times of economy-wide distress, firm-specific features play a more critical role in shaping firms’
financing decisions than aggregate variables which are common for all firms.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
5.3 Survivorship bias
The fact that some firms enter or exit the sample might potentially cause our estimated coefficients
to be biased. To see if this is the case, we re-estimate Equation (1) only for those firms that have
complete data during our sample period. On average, such firms are likely to be more established
and institutional firms with built-up reputations than the average firm in the full sample. Unreported
results show that while most of our qualitative results remain intact, there are also a few differences
that appear to reflect the differences in the types of firms across the two samples. In particular, the
estimated coefficients on the volatility indicators EarnVolat and IntVolat as well as Inflation turn
insignificant, implying that uncertainties at both the firm and aggregate levels are less relevant for
this group of firms. We also find that the coefficient estimates on Z-score and Tax turn significant
at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. A significant and negative estimate on Z-score could be
expected from a signaling and liquidity risk perspective as these firms are likely to be of relatively
higher quality. A significant and negative estimate on Tax, on the other hand, could be explained by
the observation that the influence of taxes is likely to be stronger for institutional firms which are less
likely to evade taxes and hence face higher effective tax rates.
5.4 Capital markets
The domestic supply of capital might influence firms’ debt maturity structures.23 To explore this
possibility, we also include as independent variables the size of debt markets (domestic credit to the
23For example, Claudia, Ferreira, and Laureano (2013) show that corporate use of long-term debt has decreased in
the U.S. over the past three decades and that capital markets have played an important role in this change. See also
Gonzalez and Gonzalez (2014) and Khanga and King (2015).
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private sector over GDP), the size of equity markets (stock market capitalization over GDP), and the
size of government debt (total government debt over total domestic non-financial debt) in Equation (1).
Our qualitative results remain intact except that the coefficient on IntVolat loses significance whereas
the coefficient on GDPGrowth turns marginally significant. Moreover, we find that the coefficient on
the equity market variable is positive and highly significant whereas the coefficients on the debt market
and government debt variables do not attain significance. The former finding could be interpreted as
indicating that as firms join the stock market they not only find it easier to acquire (external) equity,
and hence potentially reduce their dependence on debt, but also to extend the maturity of debt in
their capital structures. We provide further evidence on this finding in Section 6.3.
5.5 Tangibility and profitability
Although we are not aware of any theoretical studies that explicitly link firm debt maturity to factors
such as tangibility or profitability, empirical studies have occasionally used these variables in their debt
maturity analyses. For instance, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Fan, Titman, and Twite
(2012) find a statistically significant and positive association between maturity and both of tangibility
and profitability. The idea is that tangible assets play a more important role than intangible assets
in reducing the risk of default as they suffer a smaller loss of value when a firm goes into distress
(see, for example, Ko¨ksal and Orman, 2015). In addition, tangible assets are easier to collateralize
and collateral, in turn, might have a more relevant role (in reducing risk) in long-term lending than in
short-term lending (Kirch, Renato, and Terra, 2012). Finally, if firms match the maturities of assets
and liabilities, tangible assets should be better able to support long-term debt as they are more lasting
than intangible assets (Stohs and Mauer, 1996). Profitability, on the other hand, could be positively
associated with debt maturity because profitable firms have lower default risk and interest tax shields
of debt are more valuable for profitable firms (see, for example, Frank and Goyal, 2008).
To explore the maturity effects of tangibility and profitability factors, we include them in our
baseline regression equation, both individually and jointly. Consistent with earlier studies, we find
that the coefficient estimates on both tangibility and profitability variables are positive and highly
significant, implying that profitable firms and firms with a greater proportion of tangible assets in their
asset base choose longer-term debt. In addition, while most of our remaining results go unaffected by
the inclusion of these factors, the estimated coefficient on AssetMat turns insignificant, likely reflecting
the fact that tangibility also serves as a proxy for the maturity of a firm’s assets.
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5.6 Demand versus supply considerations
Recall that on average nearly 40 percent of our sample firms have no long term debt in their capital
structure each year. Data also shows that some firms never issue long-term debt while others adjust
the fraction of existing long-term debt in their total debt over time. The non-issuance of long-term
debt by some firms might potentially reflect the fact that long-term debt is typically more expensive
than short-term debt. However, it might also be due to the unwillingness of creditors to lend long-term
to firms that are not sufficiently creditworthy (Diamond, 1991). If the supply side forces dominate,
then it becomes meaningless to talk about a borrowing firm’s “choice” of debt maturity.
To consider this possibility, we investigate the maturity choices of only those firms that have
positive amounts of long-term debt in their capital structure. Results reported in Table 6 reveal
interesting findings. In particular, the coefficient estimate on Leverage in the new equation is roughly
half of that in the full sample equation. Hence, even though firms that issue long-term debt also worry
about liquidity risk, it appears to be less of a concern for such firms. This likely reflects the loosened
credit-lending standards applied to these firms by their lenders with whom they might have an ongoing
credit relationship. Also, the estimate on Size turns insignificant, implying that size has no effect on
debt maturity for firms with ongoing long-term credit relationships. This result is not due to firms
having similar size as this group of firms includes microenterprises as well as large firms. Rather, it
might reflect the possibility that only those firms with sufficiently high quality are allowed to enter the
long-term credit market, and once they are in, they can issue long-term debt independently of their
size. Moreover, among such firms, those with better quality can lengthen debt maturity further, as
indicated by the positive and significant coefficient estimate on Z-score.
The drops in the significance levels of the estimated coefficients on AssetMat and IntVolat also
appear to be suggestive of the existence of relationships between lenders and sufficiently creditworthy
borrowers. Specifically, if lenders are willing to supply long-term credit to client firms, then maturity-
mismatches or uncertainties in the macroeconomy might be less of a problem for these firms. In
addition, we find that the coefficient estimate on EarnVolat turns significant, indicating that, un-
like other firms, firms that carry long-term debt in their capital structure increase their maturity in
response to increases in their earnings volatility. This might happen if, for example, lenders have a
tendency to ease the financing of their clients by extending longer-term credit during times of financial
distress. This sort of lender-provided insurance is quite common in economies where there is a lack of
transparency and proper legal enforcement (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales, 2003a,b).
Finally, consistent with the tax perspective, we find some evidence that firms lengthen the maturity
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of their debt when the term structure of interest rates is increasing, as indicated by the positive and
significant coefficient estimate on Term. This suggests that the insignificance of the coefficient estimate
in the full sample case was probably generated by the inclusion of lower quality firms in the regression
equation. This is most likely because low quality firms are unable to extend their debt maturity and
this makes the detection of term structure effects difficult in the regression that includes such firms.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
6 Debt maturity across firm types
Myers (2003) argued that different factors might affect different types of firms in fundamentally differ-
ent ways. We now explore this possibility by systematically investigating the debt maturity structure
differences of three main types of firms: manufacturing versus service firms, large versus small firms,
and publicly-traded versus privately-held firms. In investigating the latter distinction, we also highlight
the maturity structure differences across sharper firm type classifications according to their legal form
of organization. Specifically, we also explore the differences between publicly-traded and privately-
held corporations as well as between privately-held corporations and private limited companies. These
exercises can also be viewed as further robustness checks on our main results in Section 4.
Figure 2 displays firms’ debt maturity structures by industry membership, firm size, and legal
form averaged over the entire sample period. The figure also displays firms’ leverage ratios. Panel A
of Figure 2 shows that manufacturing firms have both lower leverage and shorter maturity, although
the difference is more pronounced in maturity structures. Panel B shows that larger firms use less
debt in their capital structure and that their debt is of longer maturity. Panel C shows that publicly-
traded firms are considerably less levered than privately-held firms but that the two types of firms
have roughly similar maturity of debt. Panel D presents the results from breaking down the privately-
held firms into its constituents, namely privately-held corporations and private limited companies.
The panel also shows the results for all corporations (publicly-traded and privately-held together).
Results suggest that while the maturity structures are quite similar, there are large differences in the
leverage ratios of different classes of firms, the most significant being between those of publicly-traded
corporations and private limited companies. In what follows, we take a more systematic look at the
differences in debt maturity determinants across various classes of firms.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
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6.1 Manufacturing versus service firms
To investigate the debt maturity implications of industry affiliation, we rerun regressions separately
for manufacturing and service firms. The results presented in Table 7 suggest that the debt maturity
structures are determined largely by the same factors. For example, the two most economically
important factors, Leverage and Size, are the main determinants of maturity for both groups of firms.
In addition, factors such as Growth, Z-score, Tax, and Term appear to be unrelated with the debt
maturity structures of neither group of firms.
The most significant difference between these two groups is that the coefficient estimate on As-
setMat is insignificant for manufacturing firms, implying that these firms do not engage in maturity-
matching to reduce the expected costs of financial distress associated with possible liquidity crises (as
suggested by Morris, 1976; Diamond, 1991) or to mitigate the conflicts of interests between creditors
and shareholders (as suggested by Myers, 1977). One possible explanation of this result is that man-
ufacturing firms have closer relationships with their lenders, as a result of which they do not have
to follow a maturity-matching policy to hedge liquidity risks. Our finding of a positive coefficient
estimate on EarnVolat and a negative estimate on IntVolat in the manufacturing firm regression but
not in the service firm regression is also consistent with this interpretation wherein lenders insure their
clients against idiosyncratic as well as aggregate risks. Finally, the estimated coefficient on Inflation
is significant only in the service firm equation, implying that the stability of domestic currency (lower
inflation) leads service firms to lengthen their debt maturity.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
6.2 Large versus small firms
Table 8 reports the results from running our regressions separately for microenterprises, SMEs, and
large firms. Coefficient estimates suggest that firm growth rates, volatility of earnings, effective tax
rates, and the term structure of interest rates are unimportant for debt maturity in all firm size class.
In fact, the only factor that has a significant coefficient estimate in all size classes is Leverage, which
confirms the overriding role played by leverage in firms’ maturity choices. Therefore, regardless of
their size, firms that choose high leverage also choose long maturity, possibly to delay their exposure
to bankruptcy risk (Leland and Toft, 1996) and/or to avoid liquidity risk (Diamond, 1991).
Leverage is also the only factor that appears to have any relation with the maturity choices of
microenterprises. Note, however, that the coefficient estimates on Leverage are considerably higher for
SMEs than both microenterprises and large firms, indicating that lengthening debt maturity to control
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for the risk of liquidation is particularly important for SMEs.24 To the extent that size proxies for
quality, this result can be interpreted as being in line with Diamond (1991)’s liquidity risk hypothesis
in which both high-quality and low-quality firms borrow short-term while intermediate-quality firms
borrow longer-term. This intuition is also broadly consistent with the patterns of estimated coefficients
on the firm quality proxy Z-score across size groups. Note that while the estimated coefficients on
Z-score are insignificant in the microenterprise and SME regressions, the coefficient on Z-score is
negative in the large firm regression. Therefore, the low liquidation risk of large, high-quality firms
might be allowing them to reduce financing costs by borrowing on the shorter-term.
Results also indicate that microenterprises and SMEs do not engage in maturity-matching.25 This
result, while consistent with the results reported in Stephan, Talavera, and Tsapin (2011) for Ukraine,
contrasts sharply with the developed economy small firm studies such as Scherr and Hulburt (2001)
and Heyman, Deloof, and Ooghe (2008).26 However, it is quite likely that the small firms in our sample
are smaller than the firms in their sample, implying that the results are not directly comparable. Our
results probably reflect the fact that smaller firms are much less sophisticated than larger firms in terms
of financial management; they just follow a simple rule-of-thumb policy of choosing debt maturity in
a way that is consistent with their leverage.
Finally, coefficient estimates on IntVolat and Inflation are significant only in the SME equation,
indicating that only the debt maturity structures of SMEs are influenced by the uncertainties in the
economic environment.27 Although this result might be caused by the substantial reduction in the
number of firm-year observations, it might also suggest that factors other than IntVolat and Inflation
are more important in the maturity choices both the smallest and the largest firms.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
6.3 Publicly-traded versus privately-held firms
Finally, we consider debt maturity structure differences according to firms’ legal form of organization.
Results reported in Table 9 demonstrate once again the importance of firms’ leverage ratios and size in
24Controlling for the risk of liquidation might be a lesser concern for both large firms and microenterprises. This is
because large firms are generally highly diversified, have substantial capital, and suffer less from asymmetric information
problems, suggesting that liquidation risk is minimal for such firms. By contrast, creditors are not highly willing to lend
long-term to microenterprises in the first place as these firms are typically characterized by low liquidation values.
25We also considered small- and medium-sized firms separately. The coefficient estimate on AssetMat was significant
only in the medium-sized firm equation. Thus, while medium- and large-sized firms match maturities, microenterprises
and small firms do not.
26In their survey of American CFOs, Graham and Harvey (2001) also find that maturity-matching is particularly
pervasive among small firms.
27When we ran regressions separately for small- and medium-sized firms, we found that the coefficient estimates on
IntVolat and Inflation were significant only in the small-sized firm regression.
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the determination of debt maturity structures. Regardless of their legal form, firms that are larger or
have high leverage ratios have significantly longer maturity of debt. In addition, results again provide
no evidence that firm growth rates, effective tax rates, or the term structure of interest rates have any
relation with firms’ maturity structures.
On the other hand, while the coefficient estimates on AssetMat are significant in the privately-held
firm, privately-held corporation, and corporation regressions, they are insignificant in the publicly-
traded corporation and private limited company regressions. Thus, matching maturities to mitigate
liquidity risk and/or creditor-shareholder conflicts appears to be most important for privately-held
corporations. If publicly-traded corporations are generally of higher quality than privately-held cor-
porations and that privately-held corporations, in turn, are generally of higher quality than private
limited companies,28 this finding can be understood within Diamond (1991)’s liquidity risk model
where medium-quality firms borrow longer-term while both high-quality and low-quality firms borrow
shorter-term. This intuition is further confirmed by the pattern of estimated coefficients on Z-score
across legal forms, as the estimate in the private limited company regression is positive and that in
the publicly-traded corporation regression is negative.
Our finding that publicly-traded firms do not match maturities is rather interesting as it directly
contrasts with the majority of large firm studies, including Arslan and Karan (2006) who studied the
debt maturity decisions of publicly-traded Turkish firms. To understand this result, note that our
sample publicly-traded firms have both the shortest asset maturity and the longest debt maturity
(relative to leverage) among all types of firms. That is, publicly-traded firms’ debt appears to be
of longer maturity than the life of their assets. According to Morris (1976), this type of maturity-
mismatch might be risky due to the uncertainty of the source and volume of the cash flows which are
necessary to service the debt after the asset is retired. Given that publicly-traded firms are among
the highest quality firms, however, they are unlikely to face serious difficulties in servicing debt.29
Finally, the pattern of estimated coefficients on IntVolat and Inflation is not easy to interpret.
However, it seems rather clear that interest rate volatility and inflation are unrelated with the maturity
decisions of publicly-traded firms. One possible interpretation of this result is that debt maturity
decisions of publicly-traded firms are not affected materially by macroeconomic uncertainties since they
have substantial internal funds, have diversified their external sources of finance, and are viewed by
28The Z-score values (30.48, 13.78, and 7.08, respectively) suggest that this is indeed the case.
29The opposite appears to hold for private limited companies as their debt appears to be of shorter maturity than
the life of their assets. As explained by Morris (1976), this sort of mismatch can be more risky since the asset may
not generate sufficient cash flows by the maturity date to retire the debt. In addition, in the Diamond (1991) model,
liquidity risk arises from debt that is shorter maturity than assets and not vice versa. The low quality of private limited
companies only exacerbates this risk.
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lenders as being much more creditworthy than privately-held firms. The pattern of coefficient estimates
on EarnVolat does not paint a clear picture either. Results suggest, however, that corporations increase
their debt maturity when earnings are more volatile. This likely reflects relationship-lending effects
where lenders protect their clients during difficult times by extending the maturity of credit.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
7 Overall assessment of results
Our strongest and most unambiguous finding is that firms that have high leverage also have longer debt
maturity. This finding holds regardless of how leverage is defined and across a wide spectrum of firm
types that includes manufacturing, service, small, large, publicly-traded, and privately-held firms. In
addition, the economic significance of leverage dwarfs that of all other determinants of debt maturity,
including Size which is a rather distant second. These findings underscore the importance of modeling
firms’ debt maturity and capital structure decisions simultaneously as suggested by theoretical studies
such as Lewis (1990) and Wiggins (1990) as well as by empirical studies such as Barclay, Marx, and
Smith (2003) and Johnson (2003).
Size is another major determinant of firm debt maturity, except for two types of firms. First, size
does not appear to be related with the maturity structures of micro and small enterprises. Previous
small firm studies did not reach a unanimous decision on the relation between debt maturity and
firm size. While Scherr and Hulburt (2001) and Heyman, Deloof, and Ooghe (2008) report a negative
association between the two variables, Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) and Magri (2010) report a
positive association. Our finding falls in between the two sets of findings. As noted by Scherr and
Hulburt (2001), this mixed evidence on size could be due to the fact that size proxies for several
factors such as default risk, agency conflicts, and information asymmetry. Second, size does not
seem to matter for the maturity structures of firms that already carry long-term debt in their capital
structures. Therefore, once a firm obtains long-term financing, its size has no bearing on its maturity
of debt. This holds despite the fact that firms that carry long-term debt are on average larger than
firms that have no long-term debt in their capital structures. Taken together, these two findings
suggest that firm size might play a more important when issuing long-term debt for the first time
than in the choice of how much debt to issue once some long-term debt has already been issued. This
might indicate in turn that adverse selection problems are a more serious problem than moral hazard
problems in long-term contracting.
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Asset maturity appears to also play some role in the determination of firms’ debt maturity struc-
tures, although results depend on how asset maturity is defined and on the type of firm group consid-
ered. The evidence for maturity-matching is strongest when either tangibility or weighted measures
are used as indicators of asset maturity. We find relatively weak evidence for maturity-matching when
an unweighted measure of asset maturity is used. Following Stohs and Mauer (1996) and others, we
have chosen to use a weighted measure in our analyses. Our results show that while asset maturity is
positively associated with debt maturity for most firm groups including the full sample, it is unrelated
with debt maturity in the manufacturing, microenterprise, small firm, private limited company, and
publicly-traded firm samples. Our results also suggest that while not matching maturities may be
harmless for publicly-traded firms, it may be highly risky for small, privately-held firms.
Macroeconomic variables appear to influence firms’ debt maturity choices as well. Increases in
inflation and interest rate volatility appear to reduce debt maturity, particularly for privately-held
SMEs. Given that SMEs are an important part of any economy in terms output and employment,
these findings underscore the importance of maintaining a stable and predictable economic environment
to facilitate long-term contracting among businesses.
We find little evidence that the remaining independent variables affect debt maturity decisions.
Interestingly, the insignificance of Growth occurs despite the fact that our sample includes a wide
spectrum of firms that differ in their growth opportunities.30 The only instance where Growth is
significantly (and negatively) related with maturity is the bank debt maturity equation. Since our
baseline debt definition includes debts from shareholders and related firms, this finding might be
explained by more severe creditor-shareholder conflicts when debt is acquired entirely from external
sources. Also, when we use capital expenditures as a proxy for growth opportunities, we find a positive
association with debt maturity.
On the other hand, the coefficient estimates on the tax proxies EarnVolat, Tax, Term, and IntVolat
are either insignificant or have the wrong sign in the vast majority of our regressions. Therefore, con-
sistent with the theoretical work of Lewis (1990) and most prior empirical studies, our findings provide
little evidence that tax considerations matter for debt maturity decisions.31 We do, nevertheless, find
some evidence that taxes might matter for firms that acquire the majority of their debt from external
30Our inability to detect such influences, however, might be due to the rough way in which we measure growth
opportunities. Since the overwhelming majority of our sample firms are privately-held, we use accounting measures
rather than the more preferable market measures used in large public firm studies. Similar results are reported by other
small firm studies such as Scherr and Hulburt (2001), Heyman, Deloof, and Ooghe (2008), and Magri (2010).
31The insignificance of taxes might also potentially reflect the low level of effective taxes faced by our sample firms.
One reason for the low level of effective taxes might be a lack of proper enforcement and transparency, which in turn
facilitates tax evasion. Indeed, Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) find that taxes do influence debt maturity structures in
developed economies but not in developing economies, where taxes are easier to evade.
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sources rather than from shareholders and related firms.
Finally, the coefficient estimate on the firm quality proxy, Z-score, is not significant in the majority
of our regressions. This result is consistent with the results reported by Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal
(2006) and Cai, Fairchild, and Guney (2008). One possible explanation for this result is that our Z-
score measure, which was developed in the context of an advanced economy like the U.S., is not
well-suited for a developing economy like Turkey. It might also be due to the fact that we include
leverage in our regressions. If leverage is also a strong proxy for quality, this might drive the results.
Note, however, that the coefficient estimate on Z-score is significantly negative in the corporation
(public as well as private) and large firm regressions. This result suggests that credit quality might
be important for debt maturity choices of some firms but not others.
8 Summary and conclusion
This paper tests the leading theories of debt maturity choice of non-financial firms in a major devel-
oping economy, Turkey, between 2004 and 2013. Our analyses reveal several results. Our findings on
size and growth opportunities indicate that the agency perspective is not likely to be useful in under-
standing the overall debt maturity choices of micro and small firms and firms with existing long-term
credit relationships with lenders. However, consistent with most large firm studies, we find evidence
that size (but still not growth opportunities) matters for the debt maturity choices of larger firms,
indicating that creditor-shareholder conflicts are a more relevant concern for such firms.
Our findings on asset maturity, on the other hand, provide moderate support for the maturity-
matching hypothesis. The evidence for maturity-matching is strongest in the case of medium-to-large
privately-held service firms. Our analyses also indicate that when firms do not match maturities, they
do so in different ways. In particular, while firms that are smaller and/or have low credit quality (such
as privately-held micro and small enterprises) tend to issue debts of shorter maturity than their assets,
larger and/or high credit quality firms (such as large publicly-traded companies) tend to issue debts
of longer maturity than their assets. Thus, maturity-mismatches appear to be a more serious concern
in the case of privately-held micro and small enterprises.
In our analyses, we have considered maturity-matching as an independent hypothesis. However, as
discussed in our literature review, maturity-matching can also be rationalized within the contexts of
both the agency and liquidity risk perspectives. Viewed this way, our findings on maturity-matching
can be viewed as further evidence in support of both of these debt maturity perspectives.
Overall, our results are probably best understood within the context of Diamond (1991)’s liquidity
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risk theory. Several of our findings seem to point in this direction, but the clearest evidence is
perhaps our finding of a positive association between firm quality and debt maturity for private limited
companies and a negative association for publicly-traded companies. Since these two groups of firms are
at the opposite ends of the quality spectrum, the relation between firm quality and debt maturity must
be non-monotonic as suggested by the theory. Moreover, although we have not necessarily associated
leverage with any of the maturity perspectives in our analyses, it probably is most closely related with
the liquidity risk perspective. This is because this perspective argues a theoretical link between debt
maturity and firm credit quality and credit quality is a decreasing function of leverage (Diamond,
1991). Viewed this way, our results provide additional support for the liquidity risk perspective.
By contrast, our results provide only weak support for Flannery (1986)’s signaling model. However,
we do find that the signaling perspective can be potentially useful if viewed as a conditional theory
about the maturity choices of large, publicly-traded firms. Also, we find little evidence that tax
theories are useful in understanding firms’ debt maturity choices.
Finally, it should be noted that none of these theories was developed with the developing economies
in mind. The vast cultural, institutional, and financial differences across economies might plausibly
have important ramifications for debt maturity structures. In the context of the present paper, such
differences might be partly responsible for the apparent weakness of some of the debt maturity theories
as well as for some of our unexpected findings. Our results suggest that it would be particularly
worthwhile to investigate more fully the nature of borrower-lender relationships and how they impact
on debt maturity decisions in developing economies.
32
References
Alcock, J., F. Finn, and K. J. K. Tan (2012): “The Determinants of Debt Maturity in Australian
Firms,” Accounting & Finance, 52, 313–341.
Altman, E. (1968): “Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate
Bankruptcy,” Journal of Finance, 23, 589–609.
Ang, J. S. (1991): “Small Business Uniqueness and the Theory of Financial Management,” Journal
of Small Business Finance, 1, 1–13.
(1992): “On the Theory of Finance for Privately Held Firms,” Journal of Small Business
Finance, 1, 185–203.
Antoniou, A., Y. Guney, and K. Paudyal (2006): “The Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure:
Evidence from France, Germany and the UK,” European Financial Management, 12, 161–194.
Arslan, O., and M. B. Karan (2006): “Ownership and Control Structure as Determinants of
Corporate Debt Maturity: A Panel Study of an Emerging Market,” Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 14, 312–324.
Aysan, A. F., M. H. Gu¨ler, and C. Orman (2013): “Sustaining growth in emerging markets:
The role of structural and monetary policies in Turkey,” in A New Model For Balanced Growth
And Convergence: Achieving Economic Sustainability in CESEE Countries, ed. by E. Nowotny,
P. Mooslechner, and D. Ritzberger-Grnwald. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK; Northampton, MA,
USA.
Barclay, M. J., L. M. Marx, and C. W. Smith (2003): “The Joint Determination of Leverage
and Maturity,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 9, 149–167.
Barclay, M. J., and C. W. Smith (1995): “The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt,” Journal
of Finance, 50, 609–631.
Barnea, A., R. A. Haugen, and L. W. Senbet (1980): “A Rationale for Debt Maturity Structure
and Call Provisions in the Agency Theoretic Framework,” Journal of Finance, 35, 1223–1234.
Bas, T. (2012): “Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choices of Firms in Developing Countries,”
Ph.D. thesis, City University London.
33
BCBS (2011): “The transmission channels between financial and real sector: A critical survey of the
literature,” BCBS working paper 18/11.
Booth, R. W. L., V. Aivazian, A. Demirguc-Kunt, and V. Maksimovic (2001): “Capital
Structures in Developing Countries,” Journal of Finance, 56, 87–130.
Brick, I. E., and S. A. Ravid (1985): “On the Relevance of Debt Maturity Structure,” Journal of
Finance, 40, 1423–1437.
(1991): “Interest Rate Uncertainty and the Optimal Debt Maturity Structure,” Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 26, 63–81.
Cai, K., R. Fairchild, and Y. Guney (2008): “Debt Maturity Structure of Chinese Companies,”
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 16, 268–297.
Childs, P. D., D. C. Mauer, and S. H. Ott (2005): “Interactions of corporate financing and
investment decisions: The effects of agency conflicts,” Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 667690.
Claudia, C., M. A. Ferreira, and L. Laureano (2013): “Why are US firms using more short-term
debt?,” Journal of Financial Economics, 108, 182–212.
Cunat, V. (1999): “Determinantes del plazo de endeudamiento de las empresas espanolas,” Investi-
gaciones Economicas, 23, 351–392.
De Jong, A., R. Kabir, and T. T. Nguyen (2008): “Capital Structure around the World: the Roles
of Firm- and Country-Specific Determinants,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 1954–1969.
Deesomsak, R., K. Paudyal, and G. Pescetto (2009): “Debt Maturity Structure and the 1997
Asian Financial Crisis,” Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 19, 312–324.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., and V. Maksimovic (1999): “Institutions, Financial Markets, and Firm Debt
Maturity,” Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 2107–2137.
Dennis, S., D. Nandy, and I. G. Sharpe (2000): “The Determinants of Contract Terms in Bank
Revolving Credit Agreements,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35, 87–110.
Diamond, D. W. (1991): “Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 106, 709–737.
Fan, J. P. H., S. Titman, and S. Twite (2012): “An International Comparison of Capital Structure
and Debt Maturity Choices,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 47, 23–56.
34
Flannery, M. J. (1986): “Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice,” Journal of
Finance, 41, 19–37.
Frank, M., and V. Goyal (2008): “Trade-off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt,” in Handbook
of Empirical Corporate Finance. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Gonzalez, V. M., and F. Gonzalez (2014): “Banking liberalization and firms’ debt structure:
International evidence,” International Review of Economics and Finance, 29, 466–482.
Gonzalez-Mendez, V. M. (2013): “Determinants of debt maturity structure across firm size,”
Revista Espanola de financiacion y contabilidad, 17, 187–209.
Goyal, V. K., and W. Wang (2013): “Debt Maturity and Asymmetric Information: Evidence from
Default Risk Changes,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48, 789–817.
Graham, J. R., and C. R. Harvey (2001): “The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance:
Evidence from the Field,” Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 187–243.
Guedes, J., and T. Opler (1996): “The Determinants of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues,”
Journal of Finance, 51, 1809–1833.
Guney, Y., and A. Ozkan (2005): “New Insights on the Importance of Agency Costs for Corporate
Debt Maturity Decisions,” Applied Financial Economics Letters, 1, 233–238.
Hansen, L. P. (1982): “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators,”
Econometrica, 50, 1029–1054.
Hart, O., and J. Moore (1994): “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 841–879.
(1995): “Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining
Management,” American Economic Review, 85, 567–585.
Heyman, D., M. Deloof, and H. Ooghe (2008): “The Financial Structure of Private Held Belgian
Firms,” Small Business Economics, 30, 301–313.
Johnson, S. A. (2003): “Debt Maturity and the Effects of Growth Opportunities and Liquidity Risk
on Leverage,” Review of Financial Studies, 16, 209–236.
Jun, S. G., and F. C. Jen (2003): “Trade-off Model of Debt Maturity Structure,” Review of Quan-
titative Finance and Accounting, 20, 5–34.
35
Kale, J. R., and T. H. Noe (1990): “Risky Debt Maturity Choice in a Sequential Equilibrium,”
Journal of Financial Research, 13, 155–165.
Kane, A., A. J. Marcus, and R. L. McDonald (1985): “Debt Policy and the Rate of Return
Premium to Leverage,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20, 479–499.
Khanga, K., and T. D. King (2015): “Capital market access and corporate loan structure,” Applied
Economics, 47, 374–397.
Kim, C. S., D. C. Mauer, and M. H. Stohs (1995): “Corporate Debt Maturity Policy and Investor
Tax-timing Options: Theory and Evidence,” Financial Management, 24, 33–45.
Kirch, G., P. Renato, and S. Terra (2012): “Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity in South
America: Do Institutional Quality and Financial Development Matter?,” Journal of Corporate
Finance, 18, 980–993.
Ko¨ksal, B., and C. Orman (2015): “Determinants of Capital Structure: Evidence from a Major
Developing Economy,” Small Business Economics, 44, 255–282.
LaPorta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1997): “Law and Finance,”
Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113–1155.
Leland, H. E., and K. B. Toft (1996): “Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous Bankruptcy, and
the Term Structure of Credit Spreads,” Journal of Finance, 51, 987–1019.
Lewis, C. M. (1990): “A Multiperiod Theory of Corporate Financial Policy Under Taxation,” Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25, 25–44.
Lopez-Gracia, J., and R. Mestre-Barbera (2011): “Tax Effect on Spanish SME Optimum Debt
Maturity Structure,” Journal of Business Research, 64, 649–655.
Magri, S. (2010): “Debt Maturity of Italian Firms,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42,
443–463.
Morris, J. R. (1976): “On Corporate Debt Maturity Strategies,” Journal of Finance, 31, 29–37.
Myers, S. C. (1977): “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,” Journal of Financial Economics, 5,
147–176.
36
Newberry, K. J., and G. F. Novack (1999): “The Effects of Taxes on Corporate Debt Maturity
Decisions: An Analysis of Public and Private Bond Offerings,” Journal of American Taxation
Association, 21, 1–16.
Newey, W. K., and K. D. West (1987): “A Simple, Positive Semidefinite, Heteroskedasticity and
Autocorrelation Consistent Variance Matrix,” Econometrica, 55, 703–708.
Ortiz-Molina, J. E., and M. F. Penas (2008): “Lending to Small Businesses: The Role of Loan
Maturity in Addressing Information Problems,” Small Business Economics, 30, 361–383.
Ozkan, A. (2000): “An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Debt Maturity Structure,” European Fi-
nancial Management, 6, 197–212.
(2002): “The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity: Evidence from UK Firms,” Applied
Financial Economics, 12, 19–24.
Petersen, M. A., and R. G. Rajan (1994): “The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence
from Small Business Data,” Journal of Finance, 49, 3–37.
Pettit, R., and R. Singer (1985): “Small Business Finance: A Research Agenda,” Financial
Management, 14, 47–60.
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales (2003a): “Banks and Markets: The Changing Character of European
Finance,” in The Transformation of the European Financial System, ed. by V. Gaspar, P. Hartmann,
and O. Sleijpen. European Central Bank.
(2003b): “The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 5–50.
Ravid, S. A. (1996): Debt Maturity: A Survey, Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments.
Blackwell.
Scherr, F., and H. Hulburt (2001): “The Debt Maturity Structure of Small Firms,” Financial
Management, 30, 85–111.
Schmukler, S. L., and E. Vesperoni (2006): “Financial globalization and debt maturity in emerg-
ing economies,” Journal of Development Economics, 79, 183–207.
Scholes, M. S., and M. A. Wolfson (1992): Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
37
Smith, C. W., and J. B. Warner (1979): “On the Irrelevance of Corporate Financial Policy,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 117–161.
Smith, C. W., and R. L. Watts (1992): “The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing,
Dividend, and Compensation Policies,” Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 263–292.
Stephan, A., O. Talavera, and A. Tsapin (2011): “Corporate Debt Maturity Choice in Emerging
Financial Markets,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 51, 141–151.
Stohs, M. H., and D. C. Mauer (1996): “The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity Struc-
ture,” Journal of Business, 16, 279–312.
Turhan, I. M. (2008): “Why Did It Work This Time: A Comparative Analysis of Transformation of
Turkish Economy after 2002,” Asian-African Journal of Economics and Econometrics, 8, 255–280.
Wiggins, J. W. (1990): “The Relation between Risk and Optimal Debt Maturity and the Value of
Leverage,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25, 377–386.
38
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Value in Value in First Mean Median Third Standard
2004 2013 quartile quartile deviation
DebtMat 0.21 0.37 0.00 0.29 0.14 0.56 0.34
Leverage 0.25 0.39 0.14 0.32 0.31 0.47 0.22
AssetMat 1.45 6.33 0.39 3.50 0.79 1.83 16.55
Size (log) 4.81 4.90 3.88 4.93 4.27 4.67 5.69
Growth 0.48 0.26 -0.06 0.19 0.08 0.29 0.52
Z-score 11.96 6.29 1.53 11.68 3.43 6.07 52.54
Tax 0.16 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.15
EarnVolat 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05
IntVolat 2.13 1.01 1.01 1.40 1.13 2.13 0.70
Term 3.54 0.82 0.82 1.26 1.24 1.61 0.81
Inflation 10.58 7.49 7.49 8.52 8.76 10.14 1.50
GDPGrowth 9.36 4.12 2.13 4.55 5.67 8.77 4.58
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables de-
scribed. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 11687 non-financial firms with 56231 firm-year
observations between 2004 and 2013. The dependent variable, DebtMat, is the ratio of long-term
debt to total debt, where long-term debt is any debt maturing in more than one year. Leverage
is the ratio of total debt to its total assets. AssetMat is the weighted average of the maturities
of current assets and fixed assets (net property, plant, and equipment). Size is the natural loga-
rithm of real total assets. Growth is the annual percent change in total assets. Z-score is defined
as Z − score = 10.6EBIT+0.169Sales+101RE+10.4WCAssets + 0.3EquityDebt , where EBIT is earnings before
interest and taxes, RE is retained earnings, and WC is working capital (current assets minus
current debt). Tax is the ratio of tax payments to pre-tax income. EarnVolat is the standard
deviation of operating income over total assets over the current and past two years. IntVolat is
the standard deviation of the monthly short-term (3 months) government bond yields over the
current year. Term is the 12-month average for the fiscal year of the yield differential between
the 2-year and 3-month government bonds. Inflation is the annual percent change in the CPI.
GDPGrowth is the annual percent change in the real GDP. All variables (except macroeconomic
variables) are winsorized at 1% level in both tails of the distribution.
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Table 2: Determinants of debt maturity: Full sample results
Leverage Full sample Standardized Ranking
excluded coefficients
Leverage - 0.6336*** 0.4126 1
(0.0339)
AssetMat 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0210 3
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Size 0.0663*** 0.0327*** 0.1168 2
(0.0041) (0.0045)
Growth -0.0015 -0.0023 - -
(0.0029) (0.0028)
EarnVolat 0.0406 0.0576* 0.0077 6
(0.0339) (0.0341)
Z-score -0.0002*** -0.0000 - -
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Tax -0.0465*** -0.0091 - -
(0.0087) (0.0090)
Term -0.0048* -0.0036 - -
(0.0027) (0.0027)
IntVolat -0.0029 -0.0046** -0,0095 5
(0.0021) (0.0021)
Inflation -0.0082*** -0.0034** -0,0165 4
(0.0014) (0.0014)
GDPGrowth 0.0002 0.0007 - -
(0.0008) (0.0008)
D2008 0.0189*** 0.0053 - -
(0.0059) (0.0060)
D2009 -0.0006 0.0193 - -
(0.0129) (0.0130)
Observations 56,231 56,223
Number of firms 11,687 11,687
This table presents the results from estimating our fixed effects panel regression
Equation (1): DebtMatit = β0+αLeverageit+
∑
j βjFj,it+
∑
k θkMacrokt+µi+
it, where DebtMatit is our measure of the maturity structure of debt for firm
i in year t ; Leverageit is our measure of leverage for firm i in year t ; Fj is the
vector of debt maturity determinants, Macrokt is the vector of macroeconomic
variables used to control for the state of the economy; µi is the time-invariant
unobservable firm-specific effect; and it is the firm- and year-specific error term.
Column 1 displays results from the case where leverage is excluded from the
regression. Column 3 displays the results from estimating Equation (1) using
the standardized versions of variables. Column 4 sorts the results according to
their economic significance, where the ordering is based on the absolute value of
the standardized coefficients. Only statistically significant estimated coefficients
are ranked. The variables are as defined in Table 1. Heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Estimated coefficients on Z-score for different
quality subsamples
Leverage excluded Full sample
1st quartile 0.0406*** 0.0487***
(0.0023) (0.0032)
2nd&3rd quartiles 0.0437*** 0.0565***
(0.0016) (0.0020)
4th quartile -0.0002*** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
This table presents the estimated coefficients on Z-score
from the estimation of Equation (1) for different firm quality
subsamples. Firms are divided into quartiles according to
their Z-score values. The 2nd and 3rd quartiles are pooled
together. The variable Z-score is as defined in Table 1. Het-
eroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signifi-
cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Total debt versus financial debt versus bank debt
Total debt Financial debt Bank debt
maturity maturity maturity
(Full sample)
Leverage 0.6336*** 0.6074*** 0.6543***
(0.0339) (0.0420) (0.0466)
AssetMat 0.0004*** 0.0003** 0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Size 0.0327*** 0.0283*** 0.0331***
(0.0045) (0.0055) (0.0058)
Growth -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0060*
(0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0033)
EarnVolat 0.0576* 0.0764* 0.0663
(0.0341) (0.0407) (0.0424)
Z-score -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Tax -0.0091 -0.0190* -0.0191*
(0.0090) (0.0100) (0.0104)
Term -0.0036 0.0026 0.0024
(0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0033)
IntVolat -0.0046** -0.0051** -0.0076***
(0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Inflation -0.0034** -0.0046*** -0.0066***
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0017)
GDPGrowth 0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010)
D2008 0.0053 -0.0096 -0.0087
(0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0071)
D2009 0.0193 -0.0009 0.0048
(0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0155)
Observations 56,223 49,402 48,471
Number of firms 11,687 11,014 10,887
This table presents the findings from estimating Equation (1) for dif-
ferent definitions of debt maturity and leverage. Results reported in
Column 1 are our baseline results reported in Table 2. Columns 2 and
3 report the results from estimating Equation (1) when DebtMat is de-
fined either as the share of long-term financial debt in total financial
debt or as the share of long-term bank debt in total bank debt, respec-
tively. A corresponding adjustment in the definition of leverage is also
made. The measure of total debt differs from financial debt by also in-
cluding loans from related firms and employees. Financial debt, in turn,
differs from bank debt by the inclusion of financial leasing payables, de-
ferred financial leasing payable costs (-), and other financial debt. The
variables are as defined in Table 1. Heteroskedasticity and serial corre-
lation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Different sample start years
2003 2004 2005
(Full sample)
Leverage 0.5980*** 0.6336*** 0.6287***
(0.0292) (0.0339) (0.0376)
AssetMat 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Size 0.0403*** 0.0327*** 0.0270***
(0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0051)
Growth -0.0055** -0.0023 -0.0021
(0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0032)
EarnVolat 0.0330 0.0576* 0.0525
(0.0297) (0.0341) (0.0372)
Z-score -0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tax -0.0128 -0.0091 -0.0079
(0.0083) (0.0090) (0.0096)
Term -0.0025 -0.0036 -0.0045
(0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0051)
IntVolat -0.0017 -0.0046** -0.0050**
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Inflation -0.0002 -0.0034** -0.0037**
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0015)
GDPGrowth 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011)
D2008 0.0011 0.0053 0.0063
(0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0078)
D2009 0.0229* 0.0193 0.0194
(0.0126) (0.0130) (0.0178)
Observations 60,831 56,223 51,035
Number of firms 12,135 11,687 11,374
This table presents the findings from estimating Equation (1) for
different sample start years. The variables are as defined in Table
1. Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: All firms versus firms with positive amounts
of long-term debt in their capital structure
Full sample Positive long-term
debt firms
Leverage 0.6336*** 0.3611***
(0.0339) (0.0467)
AssetMat 0.0004*** 0.0003*
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Size 0.0327*** 0.0067
(0.0045) (0.0062)
Growth -0.0023 0.0042
(0.0028) (0.0034)
EarnVolat 0.0576* 0.1527***
(0.0341) (0.0506)
Z-score -0.0000 0.0014***
(0.0000) (0.0002)
Tax -0.0091 -0.0040
(0.0090) (0.0116)
Term -0.0036 0.0067*
(0.0027) (0.0036)
IntVolat -0.0046** -0.0031
(0.0021) (0.0027)
Inflation -0.0034** -0.0047**
(0.0014) (0.0019)
GDPGrowth 0.0007 0.0009
(0.0008) (0.0011)
D2008 0.0053 -0.0062
(0.0060) (0.0077)
D2009 0.0193 0.0084
(0.0130) (0.0170)
Observations 56,223 33,923
Number of firms 11,687 8,205
This table presents the findings from estimating Equation
(1) also for firms that carry strictly positive amounts of
long-term debt in their capital structure. Such firms com-
prise on average about 60 percent of our sample each year.
The variables are as defined in Table 1. Heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1,
5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Manufacturing versus non-manufacturing firms
Full sample Manufacturing firms Service firms
Leverage 0.6336*** 0.5971*** 0.7010***
(0.0339) (0.0409) (0.0602)
AssetMat 0.0004*** 0.0005 0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Size 0.0327*** 0.0329*** 0.0338***
(0.0045) (0.0068) (0.0061)
Growth -0.0023 -0.0037 -0.0014
(0.0028) (0.0050) (0.0036)
EarnVolat 0.0576* 0.0933** 0.0466
(0.0341) (0.0476) (0.0496)
Z-score -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tax -0.0091 -0.0051 -0.0110
(0.0090) (0.0118) (0.0139)
Term -0.0036 -0.0018 -0.0069
(0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0043)
IntVolat -0.0046** -0.0059** -0.0042
(0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0033)
Inflation -0.0034** -0.0024 -0.0048**
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0022)
GDPGrowth 0.0007 0.0004 0.0012
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0013)
D2008 0.0053 -0.0039 0.0177*
(0.0060) (0.0077) (0.0096)
D2009 0.0193 0.0180 0.0239
(0.0130) (0.0168) (0.0204)
Observations 56,223 30,770 25,150
Number of firms 11,687 5,833 5,958
This table presents the findings from estimating Equation (1) separately for
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. The variables are as defined in
Table 1. Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8: Microenterprises, SMEs, and large firms
Full sample Microenterprises SMEs Large firms
Leverage 0.6336*** 0.4387*** 0.7184*** 0.6377***
(0.0339) (0.1094) (0.0464) (0.0753)
AssetMat 0.0004*** 0.0009 0.0003 0.0005*
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Size 0.0327*** 0.0109 0.0298*** 0.0466***
(0.0045) (0.0141) (0.0063) (0.0146)
Growth -0.0023 -0.0077 0.0015 -0.0030
(0.0028) (0.0078) (0.0037) (0.0070)
EarnVolat 0.0576* 0.0231 0.0516 0.0264
(0.0341) (0.0746) (0.0439) (0.0949)
Z-score -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001**
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Tax -0.0091 -0.0176 -0.0014 0.0110
(0.0090) (0.0219) (0.0111) (0.0259)
Term -0.0036 -0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0102
(0.0027) (0.0068) (0.0033) (0.0073)
IntVolat -0.0046** 0.0005 -0.0061** -0.0055
(0.0021) (0.0060) (0.0026) (0.0052)
Inflation -0.0034** -0.0024 -0.0047*** 0.0048
(0.0014) (0.0047) (0.0018) (0.0035)
GDPGrowth 0.0007 0.0003 0.0002 0.0032
(0.0008) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0021)
D2008 0.0053 -0.0006 0.0031 -0.0001
(0.0060) (0.0177) (0.0074) (0.0152)
D2009 0.0193 -0.0109 0.0157 0.0581*
(0.0130) (0.0360) (0.0160) (0.0329)
Observations 56,223 7,979 38,460 8,276
Number of firms 11,687 1,880 9,064 1,544
This table presents the findings from estimating Equation (1) separately for microen-
terprises, SMEs, and large firms. According to the European Union’s firm Size clas-
sification, microenterprises, SMEs, and large-sized firms are, respectively, firms with
balance sheet totals less than EUR 2 million, between EUR 2 million and EUR 43
million, and more than EUR 43 million. We estimate that the ratios of value added by
sample microenterprises, SMEs, and large firms to their population counterparts are
roughly about 10 percent, 60 percent, and 90 percent. The variables are as defined in
Table 1. Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Results according to firms’ legal forms of organization
Full Public Private Private Corporations Private limited
sample firms firms corporations companies
Leverage 0.6336*** 0.6535*** 0.6338*** 0.5904*** 0.5921*** 0.7538***
(0.0339) (0.1691) (0.0346) (0.0362) (0.0353) (0.0857)
AssetMat 0.0004*** -0.0022 0.0004*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Size 0.0327*** 0.1241*** 0.0314*** 0.0372*** 0.0389*** 0.0226***
(0.0045) (0.0340) (0.0045) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0078)
Growth -0.0023 -0.0136 -0.0022 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0057
(0.0028) (0.0298) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0047)
EarnVolat 0.0576* 0.2575 0.0550 0.0821** 0.0852** 0.0015
(0.0341) (0.2688) (0.0345) (0.0411) (0.0406) (0.0635)
Z-score -0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Tax -0.0091 -0.0030 -0.0090 -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0068
(0.0090) (0.0555) (0.0091) (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0157)
Term -0.0036 0.0097 -0.0039 -0.0046 -0.0042 -0.0047
(0.0027) (0.0168) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0048)
IntVolat -0.0046** -0.0181 -0.0044** -0.0042 -0.0047* -0.0045
(0.0021) (0.0127) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0038)
Inflation -0.0034** 0.0099 -0.0039*** -0.0026 -0.0020 -0.0064**
(0.0014) (0.0082) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0026)
GDPGrowth 0.0007 -0.0021 0.0007 0.0012 0.0011 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0049) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0015)
D2008 0.0053 -0.0901*** 0.0077 0.0088 0.0052 0.0084
(0.0060) (0.0349) (0.0061) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0109)
D2009 0.0193 0.0247 0.0183 0.0271* 0.0282* 0.0067
(0.0130) (0.0749) (0.0132) (0.0160) (0.0156) (0.0236)
Observations 56,223 1,482 54,716 34,800 36,301 19,922
Number of firms 11,687 196 11,505 6,683 6,864 4,823
This table presents the findings from estimating Equation (1) separately for firms with different legal forms of
organization. The variables are as defined in Table 1. Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Figure 1: Debt maturity, leverage, and firm quality. This figure shows the relationship between debt
maturity (DebtMat) and firm quality (Z-score) as well as between leverage (Leverage) and firm quality for
different firm quality subsamples. Firms are divided into quartiles according to their Z-score values on the
horizontal axis. The variables DebtMat, Leverage, and Z-score are defined in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Debt maturity and capital structures for different firm types. This figure shows debt maturity
and capital structures (DebtMat and Leverage) for different types of firms. Panel A compares manufacturing
and service firms, Panel B compares microenterprises, SMEs, and large firms, Panel C compares publicly-traded
firms and privately-held firms, and Panel D compares corporations, privately-held corporations, and private
limited companies. The variables DebtMat and Leverage are defined in Table 1.
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